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In recent years, certain commentators have argued that Plato’s Re-public is far less hostile to democracy than it has been called. More 
important, some of them have even denied that in the Republic democ-
racy is supposed to be any worse than timarchy or oligarchy.1 Their claim 
is significant particularly insofar as it clashes with a conventional view. 
For a time, at least, Karl Popper had a sizable influence when he painted 
the Republic as radically antidemocratic. And regardless, quite a few 
scholars have thought the Republic is much less friendly to democracy 
than some of Plato’s later works are—particularly the Statesman and 
the Laws.2 The Republic has seemed to mean that only tyranny is worse 
than democracy. Yet in the Statesman, democracy is described as the best 
of lawless regimes and, apparently, as the best regime that is likely to 
exist (303a).3 Further, the Laws has seemed to postdate the Statesman 
and to endorse a certain regime that presumably is a mix of monarchy 
and democracy (see 693c–694b; cf. 756e–757a).
 So which of these two sides has it right? Does the Republic mean that 
democracy is worse than timarchy and oligarchy, or does it not? Our view 
is that pursuing this question leads to a dead end because it is not clear 
how bad democracy is supposed to be in the Republic. Perhaps a debate 
on this topic would help to answer other questions, whatever they might 
be; but, otherwise, it would be fruitless.4 What we will do here is explain 
why we think so. Since at least two commentators have denied that, in 
the Republic, Socrates and his interlocutors explicitly call democracy 
worse than timarchy and oligarchy, we will start by mentioning a few 
reasons for which we think this is wrongheaded.5 Nonetheless, next we 
will marshal (what we take to be) the strongest available evidence that 
democracy is supposedly better than timarchy and oligarchy. Then we 
will lay out (what we believe is) the strongest available evidence that it 
supposedly is worse.6 And we will close by indicating why there seems to 
be an impasse. As far as we know, much of the evidence we will present 
has not yet been offered in essays on this topic.
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1. Better tHan timarcHy and oligarcHy
To begin with, when in books 8 and 9, Socrates and his interlocutors 
catalog three unjust regimes and souls that lead to tyranny—the timar-
chic, the oligarchic, and the democratic, in that order—on their terms, 
each of these regimes is worse than the previous. It does not work to 
deny this, as certain commentators have. Among other reasons, in one 
passage in book 9, Socrates asks Glaucon to “choose now for me who 
in your opinion is first in happiness, and who second, and the others in 
order, five in all . . .” (580b1–3),7 and Glaucon replies that, “with respect 
to virtue and vice, and happiness and its opposite,” he ranks the five 
regimes—aristocracy, timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny—“in 
the very order in which they came on stage” (b5–7; see also all of 580a9–
c8). Plus, that is in line with other elements of the dialogue, such as the 
schema of approximation that has already emerged at that point in the 
conversation. In book 8, Socrates and his interlocutors agree (547c8, d3, 
d8, and 548c3–4) that timarchy is “a certain middle between aristocracy 
and oligarchy,” such that timarchy “imitates” (μιμήσεται: 547d1, d8) both 
aristocracy and oligarchy in certain respects; timarchy is an “amalgam” 
(μεμειγμένην: 548c3; μέμεικται: c5) containing elements of the regimes it 
stands between within the chain of events that lead to tyranny. And 
the rest of the conversation in books 8 and 9 about unjust regimes also 
suggests that oligarchy imitates both timarchy and democracy in vari-
ous respects, that democracy is a similar sort of amalgam with respect 
to oligarchy and tyranny, and that every other regime within the chain 
of events that lead to tyranny is also a similar sort of amalgam with 
respect to the regimes it stands between. A schema of approximation 
thus emerges in which the closer a particular regime is to tyranny in 
the chain of events that lead to tyranny, the more closely that particular 
regime approximates tyranny and, in turn, the worse that particular 
regime is.8
 Since this is how the discussion goes, there is, of course, strong indica-
tion that, in the Republic, Plato thinks democracy is worse than timarchy 
and oligarchy. Nonetheless, as surprising as this is, there also is consider-
able evidence that he does not think this and, in fact, that he means for the 
discussion to point to democracy’s superiority over timarchy and oligarchy. 
To be sure, if Socrates and his interlocutors suggest that democracy is 
superior, this apparently is inadvertent on their part (or, at least, on the 
part of Socrates’ interlocutors: perhaps Socrates is sufficiently clued in). 
But regardless, it might be what Plato intends.9 Here is why.
 In the picture that Socrates and his interlocutors paint together, the 
timarchic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical souls engendered by 
timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny are disordered as a result 
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of being out of reason’s full control. In all these psuchai, reason is over-
powered by mainly either spiritedness or appetite: tyrannical souls are 
not radically different from their timarchic, oligarchic, and democratic 
counterparts but represent only a more extreme case of degeneration. 
But curiously, part of the very sense in which democracy is said to be 
worse than timarchy and oligarchy might also make it better than they 
are. Socrates and his interlocutors agree in book 8 that there is “license 
in [a democratic city] to do whatever one wants” (ἐξοσία ἐν αὐτῃ ποειν ὅτι 
τιϚ βούλεται: 557b5–6). In fact, they even agree (562b12–c3) that “surely 
in a city under a democracy you would hear that [freedom] is the finest 
thing [κάλλιστον] it has and that for this reason [democracy] is the only 
regime worth living in for anyone who is by nature free” (quoting b12–c2). 
No doubt, for them that feature of a democratic city manifests the extent 
to which democratic souls are degenerate—ruled by base desires and 
barely restrained by reason. Yet if every citizen (557b8) in a democratic 
city has license, then citizens who are philosophers do. Whereas citizens 
under a timarchy or oligarchy have to do what the rulers think is most 
conducive to amassing or maintaining honor or wealth, philosophical 
citizens under a democracy may philosophize freely, even searching for 
the just city together, as Socrates and his interlocutors do in the Republic. 
And in a city where citizens can freely philosophize with one another, 
there is a much greater chance that someone will gain knowledge of 
the Good, if no one already has it, and that if someone already has it, 
he can help other suitable souls gain it. This is significant, of course, in 
part since knowing the Good may be supremely important.10
 All that might be neither here nor there were it not for certain ele-
ments of the Republic that hint strongly at the consideration we just 
mentioned. Most important, in book 8, Socrates says not only that a 
democratic city is “a convenient place to look for a regime” (557d1–2), 
but also that “it’s probably necessary [ἀναγκαιον] for a man who wishes 
to organize a city [πόλιν κατασκευάζειν], as we were just doing, to go to a 
city under a democracy” (d5–7). There is little ambiguity in this claim. 
In short, though elsewhere Socrates overtly indicates that democracy is 
worse than timarchy and oligarchy, he also is explicit in talking about 
democratic freedom and in saying that democracy is advantageous.
 Admittedly, Socrates and Adeimantus may speak sarcastically at cer-
tain points in their discussion of democracy at 557b–558c.11 But to speak 
sarcastically is to mean the opposite of what one says, and Socrates and 
his interlocutors are unlikely to mean that democracy never allows the 
license they describe. If they speak sarcastically, one claim they might 
negate is simply the claim (562b12–c3) that democratic freedom is the 
be-all and end-all of goods.12 On their terms, another different sort of 
freedom is more important—namely, the freedom that the soul has in 
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being ruled by reason and in thus being spared from enslavement to 
spiritedness or appetite.
 We also acknowledge that, even if Socrates is sincere in claiming 
that democracy has an advantage, his reason for making this claim is 
far from clear. For that matter, he might indicate to his interlocutors 
that democracy is advantageous not because of the freedom it allows 
but because of a certain by-product that this freedom has; for he says 
that democracy is advantageous because “thanks to its license, it con-
tains all species of regimes” (557d4), meaning—perhaps—that thanks 
to democratic freedom, citizens under a democracy display a wide range 
of behavior that provides useful patterns (557e1; cf. 409c3–d5) to work 
with when philosophizing.13
 But our point still holds. If Plato believes that democracy is advanta-
geous, then he (and Socrates, too) might have more reasons for holding 
this view than just the reason that Socrates offers in the dialogue. 
regardless of what reason Socrates offers, this passage (557b–558c) 
can prompt readers to notice how congenial democratic freedom is to 
philosophers. And that is significant, partly because this passage can 
thus work in concert with many other parts of the Republic, where 
Socrates and his interlocutors make claims that timocratic, oligarchic, 
or tyrannical rulers might deem subversive and respond to harshly.14
 Besides, the fact remains that when Socrates offers a reason for saying 
that democracy is advantageous, it is quite difficult to make out what 
this reason is. The reason he offers might even be that democracy has a 
principled commitment to ensuring equality—in other words, to making 
sure that all citizens are treated as if they have equal standing with one 
another, meaning that they are treated as if no citizen can rightfully be 
subordinated to any other citizen, such that there are no degrees of citi-
zenship. And it matters if democracy does have such a commitment—in 
other words, if it is dedicated to doing so much more than just aggregat-
ing preferences. In the Athens of Plato’s Apology, Socrates is sentenced 
to death, of course, on grounds that can seem pretty shaky.15 Yet if the 
democracy of Plato’s Republic is committed to ensuring equality in the 
sense we just named, it might violate that commitment if it allowed a 
philosopher to be executed merely for acting like a philosopher; for in 
allowing the execution, perhaps by its own standard democracy would let 
the philosopher be treated as subordinate to other citizens. In working 
to ensure equality, democracy might aim to limit every citizen’s freedom 
just enough to limit all citizens’ freedom equally—that is, it might aim 
to operate on something like John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. And if 
that is the aim, then presumably citizens are forbidden from murdering 
one another, for example, but acting like a philosopher might be within 
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the limits that the democracy sets whenever it abides by its own stan-
dard. Granted, acting like a philosopher might be out of bounds if, say, 
philosophers genuinely corrupt the youth, as Socrates is charged with 
doing. But if Socrates is the hero that Plato can often seem to present 
him as and if we are to think he is representative of philosophers,16 then 
perhaps philosophers are supposed to be innocuous enough.
 certainly, it can seem odd to talk about principled equality and free-
dom in this context, but our suggestion is less anachronistic than one 
might think.17 Plus, a quintessential feature of the democratic man in 
the Republic is that he holds a view on which a wide range of urges are 
worth indulging, including not only necessary desires but also certain 
unnecessary desires (560d2–561a5, 561b2–6, c3–5, 562b11–c3). And from 
that view, it would be a relatively short step to an ethic that says that 
not only his desires but also everyone else’s desires are worth indulging. 
That might be the ethic at work when democracy “dispens[es] a certain 
equality [ἰσότητά] to equals and unequals alike,” as Socrates and his 
interlocutors agree it does (558c3–7, quoting c5–6). Admittedly, Socrates 
and his interlocutors do not specify what this equality is. But most likely, 
the idea is at least that each citizen under a democracy gets one vote, 
so as to have the same access to political power that all other citizens 
have. And if so, perhaps what undergirds the criterion for distributing 
votes is some commitment to equal standing.
 At any rate, the Republic might, indeed, mean that philosophers are 
better off under a democracy than under a timarchy or oligarchy. And if 
it does, then democracy might supposedly be better than timarchy and 
oligarchy. No doubt, when various commentators deny that democracy 
is supposed to be worse than timarchy and oligarchy, their claim can be 
surprising. But perhaps it is not farfetched after all.
2. Worse tHan timarcHy and oligarcHy
enough, though, about that. We will now offer a reason that democracy 
might supposedly be worse than timarchy and oligarchy. In doing so, we 
will simply point to some evidence that philosophers, in fact, are not better 
off under the Republic’s democracy than under its timarchy or oligarchy. 
As we noted above, part of the very sense in which democracy is said to be 
worse than timarchy and oligarchy might also make it better—namely, if 
democratic souls are as degenerate as they are said to be, then uninten-
tionally they might foster and preserve a sort of political freedom that is 
particularly conducive to philosophizing. Yet if philosophers are suppos-
edly not better off under a democracy, then presumably the idea is that 
democracy on balance is worse than timarchy and oligarchy—worse, that 
is, because of how degenerate democratic men and cities are.
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 In book 6, for example, Socrates and his interlocutors agree (494a4–5, 
a6–7) that “it’s impossible that a multitude be philosophic” and that, as 
a result, “those who philosophize are necessarily blamed by them.” espe-
cially when Socrates then starts to speak of the “mob” (ὄχλῳ), it is evident 
that the discussion here is focused mainly on democracy, under which 
the majority rules, of course. And he and his interlocutors talk about the 
influence the mob has on souls that are naturally philosophic—namely, 
it tends to turn them away from philosophy (490e ff.). For Socrates and 
his interlocutors, there still may be certain naturally philosophic souls 
that turn to philosophy in spite of the mob (492e6–493a3). But the idea 
is that only an act of a god can spare these souls from corruption. More 
important, the idea is also that when someone persuades a philosophic 
young man to take up philosophy, the mob stops at nothing to reclaim this 
young man. It even targets the person who has persuaded the young man, 
and in doing so, it organizes “private plots and public trials” (494d9–495a1, 
quoting e6–7). Obviously, there might be an allusion here to the formal 
charges brought against Socrates (cf. note 15 above), either the character 
in the Platonic dialogues, the historical figure, or both. And in short, this 
part of the Republic suggests that philosophers under a democracy face 
a serious threat—namely, the threat that a young philosophic soul will 
want to join them in philosophizing, whereupon the philosophers will be 
attacked.18 So, perhaps we are to think that democracy is not an entirely 
successful means of securing the political freedom it promises.
 And perhaps we are also to go much farther than that. Suppose it is 
the case that a democratic regime would violate its own commitment 
in letting a philosopher be executed just for acting like a philosopher. 
even so, if a majority tries to have the philosopher executed and mean-
while a minority criticizes the effort, the criticisms might fall on deaf 
ears, even if the minority offers sound arguments. After all, at the least, 
if the democratic ethic says that everyone’s desires, and not just one’s 
own, are worth indulging, then there must be a certain point where 
democratic members of the mob do not reason very well. In attacking 
a philosopher just for acting like a philosopher, they encroach on other 
citizens’ freedom, patently violating the democratic ethic and the stric-
tures of democracy. So perhaps either they are deeply akratic or they 
have somehow managed to overlook or ignore the nature of what they 
are doing.19 Perhaps they have had to convince themselves that there 
is some way in which the philosopher is a danger to the polis, such that 
to let him keep doing what he does would be to treat other citizens as 
subordinate to him. We might think here again of Plato’s Apology and 
the charge that Socrates corrupts the youth. even if most Athenians 
hate Socrates, his accusers apparently would not make much headway 
in saying just that Athens would be more pleasant without him in it.
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 In any case, if democratic men are capable of such deep akrasia or 
blindness—if they can so thoroughly preempt the guidance of reason—
an ominous picture appears. And the picture is especially dim in light of 
certain remarks in books 6 and 8. Take, for example, the description in 
book 8 of the young oligarchic man who turns democratic. When his un-
necessary desires finally overtake his soul (560b7–8), he develops “false 
and boasting logoi and opinions” (c2). After that point, he will not hear of 
anything that would aid the oligarchic faction within him. His oligarchic 
elders in his family might advise or scold him (cf. 559e9–560a3), but 
“those boasting logoi close the gates of the kingly wall within him . . .” 
(560c7–8). And they do so even if the young man regains a few oligarchic 
scruples (561a8–b3; cf. 560d2–7). even then, he is utterly dismissive of 
true logos (561b7–c4). In other words, when he hears true logos, as we 
are told, he shakes his head (ἀνανεύει: c3).
 The point we mean to make is simple enough: perhaps democratic 
members of the mob will simply shake their heads if someone tells them 
they are violating their own ethic in attacking a philosopher just for 
acting like a philosopher.20 In light of the threat that this is what they 
will do, there is hefty reason to doubt that in the Republic democracy 
is supposedly better than timarchy and oligarchy.
3. HoW Bad is democracy suPPosed to Be?
It is tempting to conclude, then, that, in the Republic, democracy is 
supposed to be worse than timarchy and oligarchy. Yet we contend that 
to draw this conclusion is to go too far. Now, again, if philosophers are 
not supposed to be better off under a democracy than under a timarchy 
or oligarchy, then presumably the idea is that democracy is worse than 
those other two regimes. And just now, we pointed to some evidence that 
philosophers, indeed, are supposed to be no better off under the Repub-
lic’s democracy. Yet it is not clear that this evidence carries the day.
 Among other reasons, even if democratic men are capable of attack-
ing a philosopher just for acting like a philosopher, there might be little 
danger that they will. consider, for example, what Socrates and his 
interlocutors say in book 6 when they discuss three groups of men:
1. certain nonphilosophers. These men are naturally philosophic 
but are corrupted by nonphilosophic souls. Apparently, they 
end up neither philosophizing nor even pretending to philoso-
phize (see 489e–495b, especially 491b9, c2, 494a12, 495a2–3, 
a6–7, b8–c1).
2. ersatz philosophers. These men keep company with 
philosophy,21 and the mob associates them with philosophy 
 THe RePubLic’S AMBIGuOuS DeMOcrAcY 307
HPQ 27_4 text.indd   307 8/16/10   1:39:37 PM
308 HISTOrY OF PHIlOSOPHY QuArTerlY
(489d1–5, 491a4–5, 495c3–6, 500b1–7). But they have “im-
perfect natures” (495d7; cf. c3) and only mimic philosophizing 
(491a1–2, 495c9). Accordingly, they disgrace philosophy (495c3) 
and produce nothing more than “sophisms” (σοφίσματα: 496a8).
3. true philosophers. These men are naturally philosophic, and 
in spite of the mob, they turn to philosophy and “do the good” 
(489e–495c, especially 495b4–5).
Socrates and his interlocutors say that, whereas the mob thinks the 
ersatz philosophers are wholly vicious (παμπόνηροι: 489d3; πασαν κακίαν: 
490d3) and are harmful,22 the mob views the true philosophers as “per-
fectly decent” (487d3, 489d4).
 Of course, these philosophers are also seen as useless (487d5, 489c5–7, 
d4, 490d3, e2–4). And as we have suggested, they may be at risk when 
a young philosophic soul decides to turn away from the mob and take 
up philosophy (494d9–495a1). But the danger may arise only rarely: 
Socrates and his interlocutors agree that naturally philosophic souls are 
few and far between (491a8–b2, 495b2, 503b7–10). Meanwhile, the loss of 
a nonphilosophic soul may leave the mob unperturbed. Nonphilosophic 
souls can do nothing great (495b5–6), and the reason that the mob reacts 
so dramatically to losing a philosophic soul is that the mob senses how 
much this soul is capable of (494b1–c3). So, in any case, philosophers 
under a democracy might be able to philosophize for long stretches of 
time without interruption.
 Far more important, Socrates and his interlocutors end up agreeing, 
at least tentatively, that nonphilosophers could be persuaded that phi-
losophers are useful—in fact, so useful that they should rule (500d10–e5, 
501c4–502a3). Obviously, if nonphilosophers are so persuadable, there 
is reason to wonder whether they pose much threat. And if they pose 
little or no threat, then all in all democracy might not be worse than 
timarchy and oligarchy: as a matter of fact, democracy might have an 
edge on timarchy and oligarchy.
 Here, though, the trickiness of all this should be easy enough to see. 
For one can ask the following question: does it matter that when Socrates 
and his interlocutors make their claim about persuading nonphiloso-
phers, they do so specifically in the context of discussing the aristocratic 
city rather than democracy? A great deal turns on what the answer is, yet 
the answer is far from clear. Accordingly, democracy remains ambiguous 
in the Republic: the text simply underdetermines whether democracy is 
worse (and whether it is better) than timarchy and oligarchy.
 And this is not the only point where the ambiguity emerges. First, 
consider another respect in which democracy can appear to outshine 
timarchy and oligarchy. If democratic men will deem the philosopher 
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useless, it might seem that timarchic and oligarchic rulers will be even 
less well disposed to philosophers. At the least, philosophizing may tend 
to consume a lot of time, and it may do little, if anything, to preserve or 
amass honor and wealth. So, in a timarchic or oligarchic city, philosophiz-
ing might be viewed as a drain on resources. Plus, it might be seen as a 
subversive threat to the stability of timarchy and oligarchy. consequently, 
timarchic and oligarchic rulers might be prone to quash philosophizing.
 But this line of thought gets fairly speculative, of course; and as long as 
speculation is in order, one can also imagine a scenario in which philoso-
phers, qua philosophers, are on good terms with timarchic or oligarchic 
rulers. To repeat, philosophic souls, as they are pictured in the Republic, 
are extraordinarily talented. Perhaps they could, as it were, market 
themselves to monarchs, offering clever strategies for maintaining or 
increasing wealth, honor, or power. By Plato’s standards, a scenario of 
this sort might not be hopelessly fanciful, especially if some of the Letters 
attributed to Plato have a chance of being authentic or at least true to 
life. We have in mind, of course, the Letters’ would-be autobiographical 
tales of how Plato cozied to Dion and Dionysius with the hope of making 
Dionysius more philosophical. Granted, the story has it that Plato was in 
Dionysius’s good graces only for a time, if at all. And if Dionysius warmed 
to Plato, this might not be because Plato pitched himself as a Machiavel-
lian strategist. But regardless, the idea is that Plato worked to ingratiate 
himself with a monarch. For that matter, the idea is also that Plato tried 
to effect political change by influencing Dionysius. And there is some sense 
in taking this tack. As difficult as it might be to sway a fickle monarch, 
it might be even harder to sway a fickle mob. To be sure, crafting useful 
strategies to offer a monarch might consume a lot of time that could be 
spent philosophizing. But if it provides more safety or security than a 
philosopher can enjoy under a democracy, then timarchy and oligarchy 
might have an advantage over democracy. Presumably, it would be better 
to philosophize by night than not at all.
 Yet the hitch, of course, is that, even if at some point in his life Plato 
deemed it feasible to befriend and appease monarchical rulers, at the 
point when he wrote the Republic, he might not have thought this was 
conscionable. Worth recalling is the passage in book 6 where Socrates 
talks about how a true philosopher acts outside a just regime (496c–
497a). Socrates says that the philosopher
keeps quiet and minds his own business—as a man in a storm, when 
dust and rain are blown about by the wind, stands aside under a little 
wall. Seeing others filled with lawlessness, he is content if somehow 
he himself can live his life here pure of injustice and unholy deeds 
[καθαρὸϚ ἀδικίαϚ τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων], and take his leave from it 
graciously and cheerfully with fair hope. (496d6–e2)
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To aid an unjust ruler in the ways we have pictured just now might 
be, on the Republic’s terms, to participate in injustice. Now, apparently 
it only might be: perhaps, for example, philosophers could ultimately 
influence a monarch for the good, and perhaps if they did so their ac-
tions would not be unjust in the final estimation.23 But the danger is 
genuine enough. Plato might not worry that a monarch’s vices would 
rub off on philosophers: Plato might take it for granted that, even after 
seeing power and luxury up close, a philosopher still would be moderate 
in appetite. The point is simply that, perhaps in Plato’s view, to aid an 
unjust ruler is to act unjustly.
 And even when all the speculations are set aside, there still is ambi-
guity at the heart of the issue of how bad democracy is supposed to be 
in the Republic. As we have said, democracy might allow more freedom 
for philosophizing than timarchy and oligarchy do; so democracy might 
ultimately be less bad than timarchy and oligarchy because, under a 
democracy, philosophers might have a better chance of knowing the Good, 
and knowing the Good might be supremely important. But perhaps by 
Plato’s standards in the Republic the importance of knowing the Good 
does not dictate, by itself, how good or bad a particular regime is.
 After all, without question, philosophers who came to know the Good 
might bring us far closer to achieving the Kallipolis than we otherwise 
would have been. And this might be crucial, in Plato’s estimation. But 
for him, does it matter more than the fact that democratic men and cities 
will be rotten by virtue of being democratic? As vital as Plato may think 
it is to improve the chances that someone will come to know the Good, 
does he deem it worth the price of democratic degeneracy? Similarly, in 
knowing the Good, philosophers might “be in a state that is of the highest 
value” (Woolf, “Truth as a Value in Plato’s Republic,” 37), having reached 
“quite literally the truest fulfillment we can experience” (Barney, “eros 
and Necessity in the Ascent from the cave,” 360; citing 538b–586e), as 
a couple of commentators put it. But for Plato, does this compensate for 
how bad off everyone else will be in a democratic city?24
 Here, too, a lot hinges on what the answers are, yet the answers are 
quite hard to discern. Perhaps they can be pieced together from the 
text. But if so, it is not clear how. At one turn after another, the Republic 
clouds the issue of how bad democracy is supposed to be. In the end, the 
issue is murky enough, we submit, that to pursue it is to head down a 
blind alley.25
Pepperdine university
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πασιν ἤθεσιν at 557c6). cf. especially J. lear, “Inside and Outside the Republic,” 
in essays on Plato’s Psychology, ed. e. Wagner (lanham, MD: lexington Books, 
2001), 185–86.
14. This is a point that roochnik (beautiful city), Monoson (Plato’s Demo-
cratic entanglements), and Saxonhouse (Athenian Democracy) often return 
to.
15. We hardly mean to equate the democracy described in the Republic 
with the Athenian democracy under which Socrates was sentenced to death. 
No doubt, there is supposed to be a breach between actual Athenian democracy 
and the democracy envisioned, say, at Republic 563b4–d1 (cf., e.g., Samaras, 
Plato on Democracy, 63–64; J. P. Anton, “Plato as critic of Democracy, Ancient 
and contemporary,” Philosophical inquiry 20, no. 1/2 [1998]: 1–17); Saxonhouse, 
HPQ 27_4 text.indd   314 8/16/10   1:39:39 PM
Democracy, equality, and eidē, 274; Ober, Athenian Revolution, 63–64, 90–91, 
114, 178; J. T. roberts, “Myths of Democracy and Gender in Plato’s Republic: 
A reply to Arlene Saxonhouse,” Thamyris 2, no. 2 [1995]: 263–66; J. Annas, 
An introduction to Plato’s “Republic” [Oxford: clarendon Press, 1981], 300). 
Plus, consider the distinction at Statesman 302d1–303b7 between “lawless” 
(παρανόμωϚ: 302e2) democracy and democracy ruled “according to laws” (κατὰ 
νόμουϚ: e1): perhaps unlike the Athenian democracy under which Socrates 
was executed, the Republic’s democracy might be more like the lawless sort 
of democracy than the other sort (cf., e.g., D. Nails, “The Trial and Death of 
Socrates,” in A companion to Socrates, ed. S. Ahbel-rappe and r. Kamtekar 
[Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006], 16, on the tightening of laws in Athens following 
the restoration of democracy in 403 Bce).
16. For Kraut (“reason and Justice in Plato’s Republic,” 213), e.g., a philoso-
pher in the Republic is “one who knows Forms.” But if that definition is operative 
in the Republic, so is another definition—familiar from the Lysis (218a2–b6), 
Phaedrus (278d3–6), and Symposium (e.g., 199e6–200b3, 204a1–7)—on which 
philosophers strive after knowledge by virtue of lacking it. See especially Republic 
475b8–10 and 485a10–b4 with, e.g., D. r. Morrison, “The utopian character of 
Plato’s Ideal city,” in Ferrari, ed., cambridge companion, 236–38, and the far 
more extreme c. J. rowe, “Plato on Knowing and Merely Believing,” in ideal and 
culture of Knowledge in Plato, ed. W. Detel, A. Becker, and P. Scholz (Stuttgart: 
F. Steiner, 2003), 57–68.
17. Perhaps D. Scott (“Plato’s critique of the Democratic character,” Phro-
nesis 45, no. 1 [2000], 36–37) would call it misguided for other reasons, though 
we are in line with, e.g., Annas (introduction to Plato’s “Republic,” 135). Samaras 
(Plato on Democracy, 22n.18), among others, might regard our suggestion as 
anachronistic. And it might be objected that a commitment to equal standing 
has to rest on a notion of rights and that no ancient Greek ever had such a 
notion (see, e.g., Ober, Athenian Revolution, 87). But see especially F. D. Miller 
Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s “Politics” (Oxford: clarendon Press, 
1995), 93–117. Plus, in Plato’s day, at the least there might have been a notion 
of “dignity” (see Ober, Athenian Revolution, 101) or of what citizens owe one 
another, what governments owe citizens, etc. Further, in relation to the idea 
of limiting freedom for the purpose of ensuring equal liberty, see especially 
Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens, 6, 40, 144, 179–83; and Athenian 
Revolution, 86–106. And see also note 15 above on actual Athenian democracy 
versus the Republic’s democracy.
18. This seems to us a much greater threat than, e.g., that which 488a7–
489a2 suggests. What Socrates and Adeimantus say at 448a7–489d6 may allow 
for the possibility that if philosophers do not try to gain power in a democratic 
city, they will be safe enough. See §3 below.
19. Here we simply bracket the issue of whether the Republic affirms akra-
sia. To see some of the debate, contrast G. r. carone, “Akrasia in the Republic: 
Does Plato change his Mind?” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20 (2001): 
107–48; and c. Shields, “Simple Souls” in Wagner, ed., essays in Plato’s Psy-
chology, 137–56, with c. Bobonich, “Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and 
 THe RePubLic’S AMBIGuOuS DeMOcrAcY 315
HPQ 27_4 text.indd   315 8/16/10   1:39:39 PM
316 HISTOrY OF PHIlOSOPHY QuArTerlY
Republic,” in Wagner, 203–37; idem, Plato’s utopia Recast, 235–57; r. D. Parry, 
Plato’s craft of Justice (Albany: State university of New York Press, 1996), 
93–94, 158–62; T. Irwin, Plato’s ethics (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1995); 
T. c. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, Plato’s Socrates (New York: Oxford university 
Press, 1994), 90n.25, 98n.35; T. Penner, “Thought and Desire in Plato” in Plato: 
A collection of critical essays, vol. 2: ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art 
and Religion, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden city, NJ: Anchor Books, 1971), 96–118; 
idem, “Plato and Davidson: Parts of the Soul and Weakness of Will,” canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 16, supplement (1990): canadian Philosophers: celebrat-
ing Twenty Years of the cJP, ed. D. copp: 35–74; c. H. Kahn, “Plato’s Theory 
of Desire,” Review of Metaphysics 41, no. 1 (1987): 77–103; and c. D. c. reeve, 
Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s “Republic” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
university Press, 1988), 131–35, esp. 134.
20. Granted, to whatever extent or at whatever point democracy vio-
lated one of its own commitments, it might be not just a bad democracy but a 
nondemocracy—so it might be tempting to say that nothing democratic would 
pose a danger of the sort we refer to here. But even if a democracy will cease 
to be a democracy once philosophers are attacked for being philosophers, the 
fact remains that within a democratic city, philosophers will face the danger of 
being attacked in this way.
21. ὁμιλωσι: 496a6. cf. ἐπεισελθόντεϚ at 495c3; 495e4–8; ὁμιλούντων at 
496b1.
22. cf. especially ὁι δὲ πολλοὶ πολλων κακων ἄξιοί ἐισιν at 495c5–6.
23. Doubtless, Plato may be opposed to consequentialism (see, e.g., M. M. 
Mccabe, “Out of the labyrinth: Plato’s Attack on consequentialism,” in Virtue, 
Norms, and Objectivity: issues in Ancient and Modern ethics, ed. c. Gill (Oxford: 
clarendon Press, 2005), 189–214). But consider, e.g., what Socrates and Glaucon 
say at 443e4–444a3, which suggests that whether an action is just depends on 
whether it “preserves and helps to produce” the soul’s justice (quoting e6; cf. 
366e–367a; 588b–591e).
24. See, e.g., 420b5–421c7 and 519e1–520a4, where Socrates says the task 
is not to make any one group in a city exceptionally happy but to seek the hap-
piness of the city as a whole.
25. Thanks to the following people for comments on earlier versions of this 
essay: caleb clanton, Ian Flora, Dan Graham, Debra Nails, rob Talisse, Henry 
Teloh, Mark Wheeler, and Dave Yount, many of whom were in the audience at 
the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy session at the 2009 meeting of the 
Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association.
HPQ 27_4 text.indd   316 8/16/10   1:39:39 PM
